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## 26 APR 1949

	EMONATOR:	Admiral Sours, Executive Secretary National Security Council	
	Subject:	Evaluation of Soviet Economic Data	
	REFERENCES:	2. Your memorandum of 29 March 1949  b. Letter to Admiral Souers from Dr. Clark, dated 22 March 1949	
5X1	EICLO URES!	A. Draft letter from Admiral Souers to Dr. Clark	
		<u>B</u> .	25X1
	2. Dr. Clar  2. Dr	the A is forwarded in response to reference a.  About the for your information and such use as a make of it.  A squery is, of course, a very broad one and a nivestigation would be necessary to give it ent. He is concerned with an important matter, wish to have other government agencies report to cods for evaluating Soviet statistics, or the use atistics are later put by policy-makers.  The of Intelligence Research, Department of State, dicated that it considers Enclosure E a good as, though State reliance on any specific source, social responsibilities, might well vary from that the Signed by hand 4/26,	ched /49
5X1  NSC REVIEWED NO		R. H. HILLENKOETTER  ADMIRAL, USN CENTRAL INTLLEGENCE Note for Record: Reference b. returned to ES/NSC 4/26/49, (ER 0-3906) Copies made for DCI, AD/ORE, Central Record	

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JAN TA

The Monorable John D. Clark Gouncil of Becommic Mivisers Weshin ton, D. C.

Boar Fr. Glarks

concerning our evaluation of Seviet economic strength. Inasmuch as the Central Intelligence Agency is the intelligence organ of the National Security Council, the following remarks pertain particularly to the evaluation of Seviet economic intelligence in that office. At the outset I think I can assure you that the estimates which CIA has produced in this field are made with the greatest cere. Where an irreducible doubt has persisted in estimates prepared for planning purposes, CIA has, as a matter of policy, presented the higher figure in order to avoid the danger of underestimating the economic strength of the USSR. This, however, has little practical effect on final evaluations.

There are a number of important considerations in determining Soviet economic strength. The development of Soviet power under a completely state-controlled economy in no way "requires us to abandon our faith in the superior productivity of our system of free enterprise." In terms of total capacity, total production and productivity the US far surpasses the USSR. However, the Soviet leaders through the State Planning Commission have established the development of military potential as the primary task of the economy. The formidable strength of the UBSR today rests not so much on its productivity as on the goals toward which the factors of production are directed. Direct military prediction; preparation of other segments of the economy for immediate conversion to war-time production; development of relatively self-sufficient and strategically located industrial areas; and stockpiling represent a considerably higher percentage of the over-all economic effort than they do in the United States. In addition, capital goods production receives relatively such greater amphasis as emposed to consumers goods than it does in the IE.

Direct government control over all phases of the occomp (the utilization of raw materials, machinery and equipment, transportation and finished products as well as indisputable control over the transporter of the IBSR), provides a large measure of flexibility in the effective accomplishment of a limited number of high priority plans.

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
It is this special emphasis on military preparedness at the impediate expense of the civilian consumer that is the basis of Soviet strength as it is derived from the economy. Control of the Satellite economies is also being employed with this objective in view.

oviet figures without qualification, but feel that when these are carefully checked against additional sources in which CIA he greatest confidence, they prove to be of real value.	
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These sources are in turn en	raluated
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